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Bjørne Grimsrud and Torunn Kvinge‡
Productivity Puzzles—should 
employee participation be an issue?1
Abstract
In this paper we review econometric efforts aiming to identify whether employee participation 
adds to productivity growth. The overall picture is mixed. Participation may lead to 
significant but not substantial higher productivity. The theoretical predictions, pointing to the 
importance of institutional setting and a need to establish quality cooperation and long-term 
commitment from both management and workers, seem to be supported by the empirical 
results. An emerging hypothesis is that both the intensity of involvement and a combination 
of involvement, economic rewards and participation in decisions significantly influence 
productivity.
Keywords:  productivity, cooperation, participation
JEL classification:  J5, L23
1.  introduction
Employee involvement and participation are promoted for different reasons and 
embedded in various institutional settings across industries and countries. Some 
involvement arrangements are initiated mainly in order to improve productivity, 
and these are well described in the literature. Other arrangements have producti-
vity improvements as one of several objectives, for instance, codetermination or 
profit sharing.
In this paper we examine econometric contributions that aim to identify 
possible connections between employee participation and productivity growth 
with particular focus on representative participation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present key terms as well 
as theoretical explanations for possible connections between participation and 
performance. Methodological issues are addressed in Section 3. In Section 4 
we summarize empirical work and previous reviews. Section 5 presents our 
conclusions.
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2.  involvement and participation, 
theoretical contributions
Ownership is characterized by responsibility, risk taking, control rights as well as 
rights on return. Employee participation may be seen as fully or partly reflecting 
all of these features (Grimsrud et al. 2003). The way production is organized and 
remunerated is a question of both joint interests and different forms of conflicting 
interests between employers and employees. There might be, for instance, a joint 
interest in increased value added. With respect to the conflicting interests there 
is, firstly, a principal–agent problem and a conflict inherent in the relationship 
between the company (represented by owners and management) and its employees 
about the input of work and distribution of the value created. The management, 
for instance, will be concerned about how to achieve improved labour productivity 
and higher value added without paying higher salaries. Employees, on the other 
side, will want to share the higher income, which is due to improved productivity, 
with the company’s owners. 
Second, there is the free-rider problem among employees. A free-rider 
problem may arise when it is difficult to monitor a single person’s contribution 
and any one person’s reward depends on every else’s efforts. The employer/manager 
will therefore seek to introduce systems enhancing the work input from employees, 
while the employees probably would like to combine this with arrangements 
distributing control and return rights. In this paper we will distinguish between 
three categories of employee involvement and participation:
•	 Management-led employee involvement in daily work practice.2 Management-led 
involvement may give employees the opportunity to bring their experiences 
with the working process to bear through information sharing and 
consultations and to express their opinions before changes are carried out. 
Management-led employee involvement falls short of sharing control or 
return rights.
•	 Financial participation. Financial participation is mainly in the form of 
employee ownership or profit-sharing schemes. Such arrangements are 
associated primarily with return rights. However, in the case of ownership 
they include control rights as well.3 
2  Much of the high performance work system literature and other human resource management 
literature describe such management-led employee involvement. 
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•	 Representative participation. By representative participation we understand 
representative arrangements whereby the views of employees are expressed 
in a coordinated manner and where the institutional arrangement influences 
the control rights of management. Furthermore, it is assumed that this 
arrangement cannot be unilaterally altered or determined solely by either the 
employer or the employees.4 
The above categorization may cause some challenges. How representative partici-
pation differs from the management-led involvement practices of human resource 
management (HRM) is a matter of ongoing debate (see Taylor and Ramsay 1998). 
As noted by Marsh (1992), for instance, although companies allow workers to pre-
sent ideas and suggestions by means of management-led involvement, employees 
may be denied the power to make decisions. Generally, it is not easy to draw 
clear conceptual distinctions among the practices ranging from management-led 
employee involvement via information sharing, joint work groups to codetermina-
tion and co-ownership. According to Cable and FitzRoy (1980:163–164): 
[N]o single, simple definition of worker participation or industrial partnership 
can readily be given. But essentially, participation involves some form of post-
contractual worker involvement, embracing at least access to information which 
is normally confined to management and, in most cases, some involvement in the 
decision-making which traditionally defines the managerial function. It in general 
falls short of full workers’ control.
Representative participation may be organized internally or embedded in external 
institutional frameworks. Examples of representative participation are work 
councils,5 joint work/management committees, local unions, non-union workers’ 
representatives, and workers’ representatives on company boards of directors. 
Much of the theory on operational aspects of representative participation is 
focused on local unions or workers councils. Limiting representative participation 
to formal codetermination or unionized companies would, however, be too 
narrow. Obviously, other forms of structured involvement entail transfer of power 
4  For similar considerations, see, for example, Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) or Mizrahi (2002). 
Representative participation is widely described in the literature, but under different names 
reflecting different features of participation. One term is partnership, referring to the 
cooperation between employer and workforce, which may take place informally or through a 
formal structure (Guest and Peccei 1998). Another term is indirect participation (Hyman and 
Mason 1995).
5  Rogers and Streeck, for example, (1995:6) define work councils as “institutionalised bodies for 
representative communication between a single employer (‘management’) and the employers 
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from owners/managers to employees. Hence, we try to identify those involvement 
practices that include some sort of participation through collective representation.
Establishing processes
An important feature of representative, as well as some forms of financial, 
participation is that it may not have been established primarily for improving 
productivity. For example, representative participation often results from overall 
democratic principles about workers’ rights to codetermination in the workplace. 
Representation may also be linked to health and safety committees or to grievance 
mechanisms for negotiating wage and working conditions. This means that pro-
ductivity improvement is only one of several potential outputs from representative 
participation and that its implementation is not contingent on success in this field. 
Financial participation may partly be, for instance, driven by opportunities for tax 
deductions.6 Management-led involvement, on the other hand, probably would be 
terminated if not found to improve productivity. 
Performance 
Performance may be divided into productivity and pay-offs. Growth in value 
added or gross production (with unchanged volumes of input), higher innovative 
capacity, faster technical development, better quality of products and services may 
all indicate productivity growth. Pay-offs are connected to profits, improved job 
security, employment growth (or fewer lay-offs), higher salaries, more job satisfac-
tion and employee well-being. Improved productivity produces higher pay-offs for 
one or more stakeholders (owners, management or employees).7 If the work force 
is able to take out total productivity growth in higher wages, there will of course 
be no rise in owners’ returns. Equally, if owners and management receive the 
total growth in the form of enhanced profits, employees will not experience any 
improvements in nominal pay-offs. From a social point of view the involvement 
effects on productivity are the most interesting, but for the different stakeholders 
their individual pay-off will probably be the motivating factor and the basis for 
involving actively in participatory processes. 
voice
Management-led employee involvement is assumed to induce employees to 
greater efforts as work is experienced as being less tiring, more interesting and as 
having better feedback. Employees may become more committed. Furthermore, 
6  Such as introducing share option programmes etc.
7  On the other hand, higher pay-offs for one or more stakeholders may emerge without 
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employees may have more complete knowledge and information about their work 
tasks and processes than do managers and hence may be in a better position to 
plan and schedule work, to organize work tasks and work flow, and to otherwise 
identify and resolve obstacles to achieve optimal performance. Employees may 
provide technical information to management that would otherwise be costly 
or time-consuming to obtain. However, recognizing or understanding how pro-
ductivity could be improved does not mean that suggestions are routinely brought 
forward to management.
Aspects like the above-mentioned principal–agent and free-rider problems 
might lead to employee underperformance. Furthermore, communication between 
employees and management is governed by several factors other than just producti-
vity improvements. Seeking to institutionalize employee involvement in the form 
of participation may be the answer to such challenges. The voice theory (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984) argues that institutions like those created for representative 
participation provide workers with a platform and means of communicating with 
the management beyond that of management-led involvement and other chan-
nels for day-to-day information flow through the hierarchy of an organization. 
Freeman and Lazear (1995:27:50) present a representative participation specific 
model that is an extension of the collective voice argument arguing that the 
structure of the representative participation facilitates information exchange and 
participation in ways that increase the value added in the company. Consultations 
through representative participation allow for new solutions to production and 
workplace problems because of the non-overlapping information sets of the two 
parties as well as the creativity of discussions. Furthermore, participation generates 
value added by encouraging workers to take a long-term view of the company’s 
prospects. Along the same line, Blasi et al. (1996) and Brown et al. (1999) argue 
that representative participation increases information flow at lower costs. Further-
more, workers’ commitment improves through effects like employee identification 
with the company and co-workers. Workers may be better able to motivate and 
monitor each other than management. Hence—in theory—potentially improved 
performance through representative participation can be explained through at least 
two mechanisms: firstly, through more informed decisions made at different levels 
in the enterprise and secondly, through higher commitment to the decisions made. 
According to McNabb and Whitfield (1998), offering workers increased 
involvement in decision-making, a financial stake in the performance of the 
company, disclosing information about future investment plans and the company’s 
financial situation, and the development of communication channels between 
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and commitment to organizational goals and thereby to reducing the need to 
invoke close monitoring. 
Nevertheless, potential performance gains due to representative participation 
can be offset, at least in part, by the associated costs. In addition to being time 
consuming, participation may cause delays in decision-making (Freeman and 
Lazear 1995) and therefore represent a comparative disadvantage for the company. 
Furthermore, employees may negotiate less productive work practices, which 
require lower additional effort and in the end even endanger jobs (Frick 2002). 
Therefore, both the positive collective voice effect and the negative restriction of 
management effect may affect the impact that representative participation has on 
productivity (Cooke 1994).
According to the voice theory, the employees will improve their bargaining 
position through the participation processes, given their increased information 
and coordinated participatory actions. It is therefore predicted that employees will 
be able to reap more of the productivity gain from representative participation 
than other stakeholders. From the perspective of the employer/manager, assuming 
that they have the power to initiate or decide upon the shape of participation 
programmes, two considerations will determine the extent to which employee 
participation should be introduced in the company: first, potential effects on 
productivity and second, potential effects on the distribution of enhanced value 
added.8 From such considerations Freeman and Lazear (1995) predict that 
representative participation will be underprovided in a regular market, unless some 
way can be found to separate such channels of involvement from the arenas of 
factor distribution (wage negotiation). Some scholars (for example, Addison et al. 
2000) indicate that when wages are mainly regulated outside the company (as in 
Germany), the optimal level of participation is more likely to be realised because 
more involvement has no distributional effect between owners and workers. 
On the other hand, improving their negotiation power could be one reason for 
workers to engage in participation arrangements. Hence, if establishing representa-
tive participation also depends on the consent of the employees, the optimal level 
may not be realized by splitting involvement and distribution.
operation features and links
An emerging theoretical debate, stimulated—as we shall return to later—by a gro-
wing number of empirical studies, is concerned about the potential performance 
effects of different combinations of involvement issues, including responsibility, 
8  It is worth mentioning that in all types of employee involvement the key question is who 
manages to take out the gains from productivity improvements: the employer or the employees 
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risk taking, control rights and return rights. One postulate is that to be successful, 
increased involvement by employees in decision-making must be linked to a 
gain-sharing mechanism that offers workers financial incentives to take on the 
extra responsibility (see, for instance, Levine and Tyson 1990).9 On the other 
hand, profit sharing or employee ownership without direct employee involvement 
(for instance, through control rights) may not yield higher productivity (see, for 
example, Kruse et al. 2004). Generally, theory on financial participation is ambi-
guous when it comes to predicting output. With employee stock ownership, each 
worker is a minor stakeholder and has no individual influence on central decisions. 
Employee ownership per se in a company with many workers therefore does not 
give individual workers control rights and their own work effort will not neces-
sarily yield higher dividends. With profit-sharing plans, which provide pay-offs in 
accordance with individual performance, it is easier for each worker to separately 
achieve higher rewards for enhanced efforts. Profit-sharing plans, however, do not 
give workers control rights and may give incentives for individualistic behaviour 
rather than for acting as a member of a group with common interests.10 This, 
again, may not favour productivity development within companies with profit-
sharing systems. According to Brown et al. (1999), all group incentive plans have 
implications for worker participation in management and control. Requiring 
workers to bear more risk may open the door to demands for codetermination. 
Blasi et al. (1996:63) claim that existing theory provides no clear prediction of the 
relationship between employee ownership and economic performance: 
[The] impact of employee ownership may be highly dependent on the situation in 
which it is implemented: company size, employee composition, decision-making 
structure, technology, and employee relations history are some of the factors that 
may determine whether there is an impact, and whether that impact is positive or 
negative.
9  All plans that tie pay to performance expose workers to unwanted risk. Sharing in returns 
introduces a risk to the income of employees since returns are uncertain due to market or other 
volatilities.
10  The output of a work team might exceed the sum of individual contributions. However, 
ownership arrangements that improve individual productivity do not necessarily increase 
organizational productivity (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). Rewarding workers individually 
may disrupt productive interaction among employees. Another problem with individual 
compensation schemes based on the relative positions or rankings in an organization is that 
they can promote unhealthy competition among employees, which again contributes to 
reduction in output levels (Lazear and Rosen 1981). Furthermore, particularly in jobs involving 
human capital, it seems difficult to disentangle each individual’s contribution to production 
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summary 
We have identified three main categories of participation: management-led 
employee involvement in daily work practice, representative participation and 
financial participation. The two latter include control rights and return rights and 
are also channels for involvement in daily work practice. In contrast to mana-
gement-led techniques, they may have been established for other or additional 
purposes than simply increasing productivity and may not always be established 
based on joint local decisions but rather by one party’s demands, based on national 
legislation or agreements. This will especially be the case for most kinds of formal 
collective representation, often rooted in arguments for workplace democracy and 
embedded in national formal and informal frameworks like taxation incentives, 
labour codes, collective agreements, national union policies, corporate governance 
ideologies, etc. 
Given the fact that representative participation (and also financial partici-
pation) may be established and maintained for reasons other than productivity 
improvements, we expect to find a mixed relationship between these forms of 
participation and productivity. In addition, all systems and techniques of employee 
participation are associated with establishing and maintaining costs.
3.  some methodological issues
The first challenge for empirical investigation of a possible connection between 
employee participation and productivity is to identify relevant measurable 
variables. According to Marshall and Stohl (1993:137), “complex, dynamic, 
interactive processes are the very essence of participation.” Often it is not sufficient 
to measure participation by a dichotomous variable such as yes or no. Instead 
it would be of interest to have data on the quality of the relationship between 
management and employees. Furthermore, organizational changes associated with 
employee involvement make it difficult to isolate any single causal mechanism that 
affects performance. Most companies implement a mix of work practices among 
their multiple workplaces, making it difficult to determine the particular impact of 
practices that may be employed in only some of the workplaces. 
When it comes to the measurement of performance, two different approaches 
are common. First, performance is measured as perceived by management, 
employees, customers, etc. Second, hard data are used (financial records, rates of 
absenteeism, etc.).
The perception studies are based on self-reported data. It is observed that 
hard data tend to produce smaller measures of effects than those indicated by the 
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(2000:572–573), managers tend to overstate profitability, and such self-reporting 
data should consequently be used with great care.
Several analyses on productivity changes or productivity differences between 
companies apply a product function approach. That is, output is assumed to be a 
function of different inputs of which some are tangible (for instance, labour and 
capital) and some are intangible (for instance, specific participation practices). 
Productivity growth is either measured in terms of output per worker-hour or as 
growth in total factor productivity (TFP). In the first case, total output is divided 
by total labour input. In the second case, TFP growth is defined as the portion of 
output growth, which is not accounted for by an increase in tangible factor inputs. 
Productivity growth may be a result of several factors internal or external to the 
company, for instance more intensive competition, knowledge diffusion, etc. To 
identify productivity growth, which occurs as a result of participation policies, all 
these other factors should be controlled for. In practice this is difficult to accomp-
lish due to lack of relevant data. 
Possible selection and simultaneity bias should be considered. Selection bias 
comes about if a relatively high share of companies that do not apply some form of 
participation policy have had to close down and only survivors are covered by the 
survey. Even if an appropriate sample is selected, if survey respondents and non-
respondents differ in important ways, the results may be biased (see, for instance, 
Ichinowski et al. 1996).
Simultaneity bias occurs, for instance, when companies that decide to 
implement some kind of participation policies are the ones that are relatively more 
productive in the first place. Organizations that adopt innovative work practices 
may have workers of better quality and/or management teams of higher quality, 
which may introduce both new workplace practices and pursue more imaginative 
marketing, financial, and R&D strategies. In such cases it is difficult to point out 
the endogenous variable. Hence it is an open question in which direction causality 
runs.
Although representative participation does not depend on whether an 
enterprise is unionized, the two are correlated. The potential monopolistic 
power effect of a unionized company may also affect the selection of companies 
practicing employee participation. Monopolistic power effect describes a situation in 
which unions manage to raise wages above the market level and in that way induce 
organized companies to hire fewer workers. Although overall productivity as such 
is not changed, output per employee will be higher than before. The reason is that 
the remaining employees are more efficient on the margin than the ones laid off. 
Higher wages would then be matched with higher productivity through intensified 
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(investment in learning programmes). The end result of workers monopoly 
power would then be more efficient employees and eventually a more technically 
advanced industry (Schnabel 1991). Reynolds (1986:447) emphasizes this flaw 
in the production function approach when it comes to the impact of unions on 
productivity: 
If all firms maximize profits and trade unions impose higher than competitive 
wage rates on unionized firms, then the marginal productivity of unionized firms 
is necessarily greater than that of non-union labour. This is simply a restatement of 
the familiar first-order conditions. 
An important warning, which Reynolds mentions, is that simply comparing 
labour productivity between companies reveals little about effects of employee 
participation. It is necessary to control for changes in all relevant inputs when 
comparing changes in productivity. For instance, we have to ask whether higher 
salaries eventually induce higher levels of technology in unionized companies. As 
a result more capital-intensive production would yield higher labour productivity 
from the same stock of employees.11
FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987b) offer another explanation of higher 
productivity in unionized companies. According to their management push theory, 
hard driving managers are said to elicit relatively more output from their workers 
and generate comparatively higher value added. The workers react by joining 
unions, which results in the observed positive correlation between profitability/
productivity and unionism.
Hence, it is not only a question of identifying a positive relationship between 
participation and productivity at company level. As we have argued, because 
participation is correlated with unionization and because participation in itself 
is believed to strengthen the negotiation position of employees, it is necessary 
to make sure that observed correlations between employee participation and 
productivity cannot be accounted for as a wage effect, i.e., higher remuneration 
requires productivity improvements.
11  In regard to this question, it should also be noted that in Europe the wage differences between 
unionized and non-unionezed companies tends to be low because wage agreements are 
normally made for industry-wide standards. It is primarily in the US that high wage differences 
are to be found. Secondly, several datasets are based on perception, i.e., management is asked 
whether employee involvement has lead to higher productivity; see, for instance, Schnabel 
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4.  Review of empirical contributions
Empirical research on the economic effects of representative participation has 
primarily taken place in Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA, but there 
are also several contributions from Australia, Canada, other EU countries and 
Japan. Small open economies with a tradition of union–management cooperation 
are not well represented. Nevertheless, this gives us data from at least two very dif-
ferent institutional settings, namely the Anglo-American (where the establishment 
of representative participation is mainly decided on locally) and the continental 
European (where representative participation is embedded in national labour 
codes). Empirical contributions are based on several data sets with a majority of 
enterprise surveys covering at least the manufacturing industry. Most of the data 
reported here are from the 1990s with a couple of more recent as well as some 
earlier contributions. Cross-sectional data are mainly used, but there are also a few 
panel data studies. 
The majority of the surveys are so-called perception studies in which the 
respondents are asked to indicate whether different participation initiatives are 
believed to have an impact on different output measures. The respondents are 
mainly managers of enterprises. In a few cases, information from managers is 
combined with information from employees or employee representatives.
4.1 General findings 
First, we note that although labour codes and/or nationwide agreements provide 
for setting up of local representative participation structures, the actual formation 
needs some sort of local initiative. Who decides whether to establish participation 
structures varies from country to country, between industries and according 
to enterprise size. It is, however, common that one party (in most cases, the 
employees) will demand the establishment of local structures on the basis of 
legislation or nationwide collective agreements. For example, the German Works 
Constitution Act (WCA) mandates that councils can be elected by the workforce 
in establishments with five or more employees. However, as their creation 
depends on the initiative of an establishment’s employees, by no means all eligible 
establishments have councils. This variation between establishments concerning 
the implementation of works councils allows an empirical assessment of the 
productivity impact of works councils (Zwick 2003). 
Second, when an enterprise is covered by a collective agreement and/or partial 
union membership, it does not automatically imply representative participation. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom, 40 per cent of workplaces with 10 or 150  Bjørne Grimsrud and Torunn Kvinge
more workers—which are covered by collective agreements—had no on-site/
local union representatives in 1998 (Bryson and Wilkinson 2001). In Norway 
the similar figure was 10 per cent in 2003 (Kvinge et al. 2005). On the other 
hand, in Anglo-American systems, local representative participation is frequent 
far beyond unionized companies. In the US only 8 per cent of employees in the 
private sector are unionized, while an additional 15 per cent are covered by non-
union representative participation; in Canada 18 per cent of the employees in the 
private sector are members of unions and an additional 14 per cent are covered by 
non-union representative participation (Tara and Kaufman 2006). In Australia the 
corresponding figures are 38 per cent and 14 per cent (Pyman et al. 2006).12 
In general, we cannot assume that initiatives establishing participatory struc-
tures are motivated by considerations of local productivity. However, the fact that 
they are more widespread than unionization might indicate some local demand for 
them.
Germany
Some of the richest literature is based on the German experience, where the work 
councils in particular have attracted interest. The work councils provide a formal 
and ongoing channel of labour management communication and cooperation 
that goes beyond the collective voice institutions in Anglo-American practice. The 
empirical literature from Germany starts with several studies based on relatively 
small cross-sectional data sets. FitzRoy and Kraft (1986) find a significantly 
negative effect of (estimated) work councils on productivity, while (estimated) 
productivity has a barely significant effect on the probability of a council being 
established. Gurdon and Rai (1990), Addison et al. (1996) and Addison and 
Wagner (1997) all conclude that there is no support for the proposition that works 
councils favourably influence outcome indicators. Schnabel (1991) as well as 
Schnabel and Wagner (1994) review the German literature on trade unions and 
productivity and report positive voice effects. 
More recent contributions—based on larger data sets, including panel 
data—seem to be more in support of voice effects. Addison et al. (2000, 2004) 
and Fitzroy and Kraft (2005) both conclude that mandatory work councils do 
not impair, and may even improve, the productivity of German establishments. 
Then again, these findings are not always significant for all types of establishments, 
especially not for smaller German companies with less than 500 employees. 
Frege (2002) focuses on more indirect measures of the effects of work 
councils on turnover and training and refers to the work of Backes-Gellner et al. 
12  These facts challenge the use of union recognition as a dummy indicator for representative 
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(1997), which shows a significant negative correlation between work councils 
and turnover. Frick and Möller (2002) and Frick and Lehmann (2003) conclude 
that the existence of work councils seems to have clear-cut consequences for 
company performance. First, the presence of a work council has—other things 
being equal—a significantly positive influence on labour productivity and a 
significantly negative influence on profitability. Second, work councils have 
no effect on investment behaviour and/or on innovations (neither product nor 
process innovations). However, here attention should be drawn to methodological 
considerations, as most empirical studies are unable to control for the capital stock 
of the companies. These studies are thus incapable of ruling out the possibility that 
it is capital intensity rather than the presence of a works council that fosters the 
level of economic performance. 
Britain
In Britain, two forms of bipartite employee involvement have been examined, 
the Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) and union recognition. The latter 
includes many forms of cooperation based on agreements and traditions differing 
from industry to industry. The JCCs are not mandatory and are not given any 
co-determination power through national legislation as the work councils in 
Germany are. JCCs exist in both unionized and non-unionized companies, and 
hence are seen by some (see Frege 2002) as being qualitatively different from 
mandatory work councils. However, in respect to participation these committees 
perform some of the same functions described as voice effects, given that employee 
representatives are either elected or appointed by workers, and that management 
cannot unilaterally terminate the committee’s work. 
Most of the published research over the last decade is based on one of the two 
data sets: the third (1990) Workplace Industrial Relation Survey (WIRS3) and the 
Workplace Employee Relation Survey from 1998 (WERS98). Neither includes 
panel data, but the design is relatively similar. Both are representative across indus-
tries at the time of the survey and include approximately 2000 enterprises each. 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) sum up the literature prior to WIRS3 as suggesting 
that union presence tends to be negatively associated with economic outcomes 
but might be associated with lower turnover rates. Using the WIRS3 to examine 
links between employee involvement, contingent pay, different forms of collective 
representation and six different outcomes (productivity levels, productivity growth, 
change in employment, climate of relations between management and labour, quit 
rate, and absenteeism rate) they found that trade unions are negatively associated 
with productivity growth and climate of industrial relations at the workplace, 
i.e., negative voice effects. JCCs were found to have either no association or only 152  Bjørne Grimsrud and Torunn Kvinge
weak links with any of the outcomes, including a weak favourable association with 
productivity growth and climate of industrial relations. The authors emphasize 
that it is very difficult to establish causality in cross-sectional studies like this 
and it may be best to think of the results as evidence of patterns in the data—of 
association among variables –rather than as a clear-cut causes and effects. By 
means of WIRS3, Addison et al. (2000) find that the establishment of JCCs is 
positively associated with productivity changes in non-unionized companies. 
There is no significant association between JCCs and profit or with wage level. 
Using WERS98, Addison and Belfield (2000 and 2001) find no significant impact 
of JCCs on profits, but unions did not have any negative impact on profits either. 
JCCs are found to be negatively associated with productivity, while unions are 
positively associated, i.e., the opposite of Fernie and Metcalf’s results cited above. 
Two explanations are offered for this: first, that the reality on the ground has 
changed,13 and second, that the data, methodology and/or theoretical foundation 
used for research into participation and performance can be questioned. 
United States
In the United States most research on representative participation has concentrated 
on local union management cooperation. Voos (1987, 1989), based on a survey of 
Wisconsin companies, finds that in-house joint management–union committees 
contribute to improvements in company performance, but less than gain-sharing, 
profit-sharing and employee involvement programmes do. Local area community-
wide union management cooperation committees had, however, no effects. 
Addison and Hirsch (1989) as well as Mishel and Voos (1992) offer overviews of 
US literature examining union effects on economic performance. Product function 
studies indicate small overall impacts of unions on productivity. Positive effects, 
when they exist, appear to result from management responses to decreased profit 
expectations. To put this finding in perspective; there is a comprehensive literature 
in the US describing the effects of management-led involvement14 as well as the 
effects of financial participation. With both participation arrangements, a very 
13  This refers to events like that during the 1990s in which the British Trade Union Council 
(TUC) changed its attitude towards participation. During the same period there was a strong 
swing away from separate bargaining to single table bargaining at unionized workplaces.
14  There is an established tradition focusing on how employee involvement programmes (EI) 
and other Human Resource Management (HRM) techniques influence productivity. See, for 
instance, Arthur (1994), Becker and Gerhart (1996), Capelli and Neumark (1999), Cooke 
(1992, 1994), Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991), Dyer and Reves (1995), Edwards and Wright 
(2001), Freeman et al. (2000), Godard (2001), Guest et al. (2003), Huselid (1995), Ichniowski 
and Shaw (1999), Ichniowski et al. (1996, 1997), MacDuffie (1995), Miller and Monge 
(1986), Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997), Verma and McKersie (1987), Voos (1987, 1989), Wagar 
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mixed picture is revealed. When analysing US data for the period 1983–1993, 
Freeman and Kleiner (2000), for instance, find that—contrary to common 
belief—management-led programmes do not statistically improve productivity 
but do increase workers well-being. The authors suggest two explanations for their 
finding. First, methodically it may be difficult to discern a productivity effect due 
to sample size limitations, unexplained variation or measurement problems. The 
second explanation is that in fact management-led programmes are an innovation, 
in which economic gain accrues largely to workers (and managers) rather than to 
the company and its shareholders.15 Blasi and Kruse (1996 –using a dataset on 
employee-hold stock in U.S. public companies for the period 1980–1990 –find no 
automatic connection between employee ownership and performance, suggesting 
that company-specific factors such as employee relations climate, human resource 
policies, and workplace governance structures might play an important role in 
determining whether employee ownership has positive effects. 
Japan
In Japan, research on representative participation is based around unions that, 
unlike those in many other countries, are company-based. This organizational 
form provides direct links between the company’s position and the union’s pro-
sperity. Nevertheless, findings are also mixed in Japan. Benson (2006) summarizes 
the Japanese literature as documenting positive relations between unions and 
productivity and negative relations between unions and profit. On the other hand, 
Brunello (1992) finds that productivity in unionized Japanese companies is 15 per 
cent lower than in similar non-unionized companies. An explanation offered by 
Marsh (1992) is that employee involvement in Japan is not followed by the same 
decentralization of power and decisions as it is, for example, in the UK.
4.2 What explains the mixed picture? 
With such a mixed picture regarding the connection between productivity and all 
three forms of participation, several papers try to go behind the data and point to 
factors that can explain the findings. The literature shows some interesting cross-
national understanding of how participation contributes to productivity growth.
15  Why might this be? One possibility is that an increasingly educated and knowledgeable 
work force wants more independent decision-making in their jobs. Modern information 
technologies may also be complementary with employee decision-making, so that the growth 
of management-led programmes reflects technological change embodied in workers rather than 
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Institutional settings 
The national institutional setting is crucial and determines the conditions under 
which representative participation can be created, who should participate and the 
areas of competence. Regulations vary substantially across nations and industries 
and over time. In both Britain and Germany, recent studies seem to report a 
more positive connection between representative participation and productivity 
than earlier studies. In both countries the legislation has changed over time and 
this might explain the diverse findings. However, they might also be as a result 
of learning to adopt and use representative participation as a mean for improving 
productivity. For the employer, employee participation may not be a chosen 
road in the first place, but when the representative participation has already been 
established it becomes a question of how to utilize it in a productive manner. 
In Britain, there are, as mentioned, two possible arrangements: a) union 
involvement and b) involvement through JCCs.. Empirical results point in 
different directions for both types. The institutional setting and the development 
in regard to national influence on the local agenda seem to be more important. 
Structural changes took place between 1990 and 1998, including a more positive 
attitude by trade unions towards representative participation and the development 
of integrative rather than distributive collective bargaining strategies (terminology 
from Taylor and Ramsay 1998). The change (and even paradigm shift) in union–
management relations during the 1990s was a result of changes in legislation as 
well as in union policies. Stronger product market competition and increased 
globalization might also have contributed to limiting the power of central unions. 
As a result, unions are generally less politicized and centralized today than 20 
years ago, and this could explain why involvement programmes are now more 
likely to bring positive results. Along the same line, Voos (1987, 1989)—based 
on a survey of US companies—finds that in-house joint union management 
committees contribute to improvements in company performance, while local area 
community-wide union management cooperation committees had no effect. Some 
argue the reverse, namely that successful participation programmes may lead to 
decentralization of union power. According to Levinson (2000), the introduction 
of board representation and the Codetermination Act have probably contributed 
to decentralization of the Swedish unions. 
In all sorts of representative participation the ability to work constructively 
with employers is critically dependent on the representatives’ ability to deliver 
worker support for change. These considerations may explain why employers 
are less likely to listen to the representatives if only a minority of employees back 
them (Cully et al. 1999). Fernie and Metcalf (1995) find that strong union repre-
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(1998) use interviews with manual workers’ representatives (shop floor stewards) 
in WIRS3 (UK data) to determine that there are no statistically significant direct 
relationships between union density and workers’ efforts. However, strong unions 
accompanied by good employee relations have a positive influence on worker 
productivity.
Operation of representative participation 
The way in which representative participation operates in practice is shaped locally. 
Several studies point to the climate of cooperation and management attitude as 
key factors to explain the productivity outcome of participation (as for example 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991). This climate is shaped by elements like the parties’ 
attitude and the link to local conflict resolution mechanisms. 
In regards to attitude, it is clear that one party cannot create a harmonious 
relation alone. No matter how constructive employees wish to be, or how well 
they are organized, a cooperative environment is likely to require that management 
work constructively together with employees. Only when both employees and 
management have a supportive attitude may the space for collaboration be created 
(Hyman 1997: 323). Similarly, the actions of one party may be responsible for 
poor financial performance. However, as Denny and Muellbauer (1988: 6) argue 
in the case of this one party being a union, “it is not the independent effect 
of trade unions but the interaction of unions and management that can cause 
improved economic performance.” Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) finds that, if the 
enterprise is unionized, a positive management attitude towards unions yielded 
higher profit. This is confirmed by Wagar (1997) who reveals a positive relation 
between labour management climate in unionized companies and productivity, 
based on interviews with both managers and shop floor stewards in Canada. 
Bemmels (1987), analysing 46 US manufacturing plants, discovers a negative 
union impact on productivity. Unions, which reduce the effects of managerial 
productivity improvement practices and poor labour management relations, may 
to a large extent explain this result. Bryson (1999) shows that in workplaces with 
strong unions with on-site representation, a good climate was best achieved where 
employees thought that management encouraged union membership. Climate was 
poorest when management opposition to union membership met strong unions. 
However, among non-unionized workplaces encouragement of union membership 
was very rare and employees were most likely to view employee relations positively 
when union membership was not considered an issue. 
In regards to links to local conflict resolution mechanisms Deery and Iverson 
(2005) construct –by the use of panel data on the Australian Finance Industry—a 
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making (combined with a positive management attitude towards unions) and 
higher productivity and service quality, in line with voice theory.
Complementary and combination effects 
Using cross-sectional data from the Danish private sector, Nielsen and Lundvall 
(2003:28) uncover a strong correlation between representative participation and 
innovation and learning organizations. McNabb and Whitefield (1998) find that 
UK companies with both unions and a management initiated employee involve-
ment scheme are positively associated with profits, while those enterprises with 
unions but no employee involvement scheme are negatively associated with profits. 
Based on data from the US, Cooke (1994) finds that employee involvement 
programmes contribute substantially more to performance in unionized companies 
than in non-union companies, whereas profit and gain sharing programmes 
contribute substantially more to performance in non-union companies than in 
unionized companies. The existence of representative participation may increase 
the general level of involvement. Union presence affects the scope and depth of the 
work council agenda and work councils and unions influence the direct involve-
ment agenda (see, for example, Woods et al. 2005). Based on German panel data, 
Zwick (2003) finds that works councils have a positive impact on the productivity 
effects of management lead involvement. Eaton (1994), using data from managers 
and trade union officials in Midwestern states, finds support for the potential 
positive role unions might play in employee participation programme.
Concerning the combination of representative participation with financial 
participation, there is likewise an extensive literature.16 Doucouliagos (1995) offers 
a meta-analysis of 34 published and statistically independent studies on the effects 
of participation on productivity while discriminating between labour-managed 
companies and participatory capitalist companies. He finds that profit sharing, 
worker ownership and worker participation in decision-making are all positively 
associated with productivity, while mandated codetermination is negatively 
associated with productivity. The average correlations are small, although many 
are statistically significant. Moreover, the correlations are stronger among labour-
managed companies (companies owned and controlled by workers) than among 
participatory capitalist companies. The author stresses that the results do not 
16  See, for instance, Bhargava (1994), Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), Blasi et al. (1996), Brown 
et al. (1999), Cable and Wilson (1989, 1990), Conyon and Freeman (2000), Cooke (1994), 
Estrin et al. (1997), FitzRoy and Kraft (1986, 1987a, 1995), Gregg and Machin (1988), Jones 
(1987), Jones and Kato (1993, 1995), Kim and Voos (1997), Kruse (1992), Kruse and Blasi 
(1995), Long (2000), Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997), Sesil et al. (2002), Voos (1987, 1989), and 
Wadhwani and Wall (1990), Weitzman and Kruse  (1990).
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necessarily mean that there is a causal relationship between the different forms of 
participation and productivity. Doucouliagos (1995) also finds that profit sharing 
has a more positive association with productivity than has worker participation in 
decision-making, but only in labour-managed companies. These deviating findings 
may be explained by the fact that workers in labour-managed companies are 
actually workers-entrepreneurs who are likely to be more interested in profits and 
the companies’ survival than ordinary employees would be. Also from Japan (Kato 
and Morishima 2002) and Australia (Taras and Kaufman 2006) it is reported that 
clustering of participation practices is associated with a higher level of productivity. 
5.  summary and conclusions 
Participation structures are often embedded in national labour codes (mandatory), 
regulations or nationwide collective agreements. Mandated voice systems, like 
work councils and other forms of codetermination, are mostly found in conti-
nental Europe. 
Notwithstanding different institutional settings and arrangements for 
establishing employee participation, actual practice will be decided upon locally in 
each company. What characterizes participation practices with positive impacts on 
productivity? Theory offers some guidelines through describing structural condi-
tions (commitment, long-term view, focus on collective interests) for value-adding 
participatory systems in the company. 
In this paper we have reviewed econometric efforts to map the possible 
connection between representative participation and productivity. A very mixed 
picture is emerging. Many of the empirical contributions demonstrate no or 
insignificant correlations between the independent variables and productivity 
while other studies report positive, but small, productivity gains from partici-
pation. Several studies find positive effects of combinations of different types of 
involvement. The results can point to a potential learning or adoption process 
where representative participation may come in as a part of a national agenda 
of workplace democracy, but in addition, over time develops into productivity-
promoting local voice mechanisms. 
The majority of the surveys are so-called perception studies, in which the 
respondents are asked to indicate whether different participation initiatives are 
believed to have an impact on different output measures. Such studies are found 
to over-report effects. Furthermore, a major obstacle in all studies of this type is to 
identify clear-cut and measurable explanatory variables and to control for selection 
bias and simultaneity bias.
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and long-term commitment from both management and workers as an explana-
tion of why representative participation may enhance productivity growth. This 
seems to be supported by the empirical results that emphasize the institutional 
setting and the relationship between labour and management as critical factors 
explaining how involvement and participation affect productivity. Those who 
manage to establish well-structured local institutions separate from—but in 
conjunction with—other labour institutions (such as wage settlement and 
grievance) and fill these with commitment-creating processes seems to make the 
best of employee participation.
For future research some sort of measure of the cooperation structure, 
intensity and climate in the specific companies seems to be warranted in order to 
explain the productivity outcome of employee participation. 
Complementarity and even combination effects between different types of 
involvement like financial, management-led and representative participation seem 
to be supported by the empirical studies. Notably, management-led involvement 
techniques are more often reported to strengthen rather than to weaken repre-
sentative participation when both are present, and the presence of representative 
participation seems to improve the productivity performance of management-led 
involvement. Furthermore, productivity gains from financial participation appear 
to be strengthened through the existence of the two other measures. This differs 
from that part of the management literature that argues for establishing partici-
pation programmes in which control rights and return rights are excluded. 
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